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There is a long, interdisciplinary tradition of examining why organizations remove privileges 
from members as a part of disciplinary action. In contrast, little is known about why 
organizations return privileges after disciplinary action has occurred. Nonetheless, such 
reinstatement is ubiquitous in organizations. This paper provides a starting point for a theory of 
reinstatement by using the emerging theoretical domain of relationship repair. Treating 
reinstatement as relationship repair highlights the importance of causal attribution, social 
equilibrium, relationship structure, and power as means of relationship repair. The paper uses 
these four bases of relationship repair to develop a series of specific motivations for why 
managers might reinstate privileges. 
 







Recently, a Pennsylvanian surgeon was barred from performing specific types of cancer-related 
surgeries. The peer review committee to which he was subject informed him that he could not 
perform these surgical procedures, though he was able to continue all other medical duties at the 
hospital where he worked. Following numerous petitions from patients and a court mandate, his 
full surgical privileges were reinstated (Waters 2007). 
 
This case is just one of many instances of reinstatement in which managers and other 
organizational agents return privileges that they have previously taken away. Reinstatement 
occurs in all organizational settings (e.g., religious, athletic, professional, and commercial). For 
example, members of Christian churches may have member privileges (e.g., taking of the 
sacrament or communion) reinstated after making penance and receiving forgiveness 
(Augustine-Adams 1998–1999; Estes 1972). In athletic teams, players regain play privileges 
after being “benched,” as was the case of college football star Ricky Jean-Francois 
(Fernandez 2008). Professionals also lose and regain privileges from professional bodies, as in 
the cases of lawyers and medical doctors (Grant and Alfred 2007; Levine 1998). And, of course, 
reinstatement is often at the root of many industrial labor disputes. In a memorable historical 
example, more than 5,000 maintenance workers had their terminations rescinded after wage 
disputes were settled (New York Times 1936). As these examples demonstrate, reinstatement is 
ubiquitous and varied; many instances of discipline have the potential to occasion reinstatement. 
 
Despite this ubiquity and decades of calls from scholars (e.g., Jones 1961; McDermott and 
Newhams 1971), there has been very little research on reinstatement (cf. Bakirci 2004; 
Bamberger and Donahue 1999; Rodgers et al. 1986). This dearth contrasts with the vast body of 
work examining why managers discipline (e.g., remove privileges) (Church 1963; 
Solomon 1964; Wheeler 1976), how managers discipline (Kulik 2004; Trevino and 
Weaver 1998), and how transgressors behave after being disciplined (Johnson 1985; Trice 1990). 
The purpose of this paper is to begin filling this void concerning reinstatement. The discussion 
provides an initial framework for the study of reinstatement by considering what conditions 
would induce managers to reinstate previously removed privileges. 
 
This paper is divided into four sections. Section one defines reinstatement and discusses its 
practical and theoretical relevance. Section two reviews the relationship-repair domain and 
explains how reinstatement is a form of relationship repair. In doing so, the current paper extends 
the emerging relationship-repair domain by discussing power as an overlooked basis for 
relationship repair. Section three develops seven propositions about why managers may reinstate 
member privileges. The last section discusses the theoretical implications of reinstatement and 




In this section, reinstatement is defined, placed in the context of organizational discipline, and 




Reinstatement is any action where a manager or other agent restores previously removed 
organizational privileges to a recipient. For example, the surgeon discussed at the start of this 
article had his full surgical privileges restored through reinstatement from the peer review 
committee. For parsimony, this paper uses the term manager to refer to everyone who reinstates 
privileges; in this context, manager should therefore be understood to include anyone with the 
authority to remove and reinstate organizational privileges. This would include not only literal 
managers, but also religious leaders, military commanding officers, and members of disciplinary 
boards in various professional associations. Whenever one of these agents restores an 
organizational privilege that was previously taken away, reinstatement has occurred. 
 
The definition of reinstatement is premised on the assumption that giving and receiving new 
privileges is not the same as restoring and regaining lost privileges (e.g., a promotion is not the 
same as being restored after a demotion). From the perspective of the recipient, the difference 
between gaining new privileges and regaining lost ones will be substantial, due to the 
endowment effect, which is a reliable psychological bias that causes individuals to over-value 
items in their possession relative even to identical items that they do not possess (Kahneman et 
al. 1990; Thaler 1980). Moreover, while there has been no formal study of the psychology of 
managers reinstating privileges, research on perspective-taking and empathy demonstrates that 
individuals are aware of endowment effects in others, allowing them to recognize that re-gaining 
is very different from initially receiving (Van Boven et al. 2000). In addition, since reinstatement 
is the return of lost privileges, it necessarily follows discipline, and therefore will usually be 
conducted amidst issues such as breached trust and negative emotions and exchanges (see 
Dirks et al. 2009 for a review). These negative conditions will reinforce the difference between 
reinstatement and the initial giving of privileges (Luce et al. 1997). 
 
It is worth noting that this paper refers to individuals’ reinstatement, but reinstatement is not 
restricted to a single individual. A collective may also be reinstated. For example, the Phi Beta 
Sigma fraternity had its pledging privileges reinstated after losing them for participating in 
illegal hazing activities (Maughan 2003). Similarly, three American universities which lost the 
privilege to conduct research after a suspension by federal mandate subsequently had these 
privileges reinstated (Sciarra 1999). However, for the sake of clarity and brevity, this paper 
refers only to the reinstatement of individuals’ privileges. 
 
It should also be noted that this paper is concerned only with the motivations for a manager to 
reinstate privileges and does not explore the processes of reinstating, the experience and 
concerns of the organizational member who is reinstated, or whether it is appropriate to reinstate 
privileges. Obviously, all of these are important issues, and must be addressed in developing a 
complete theory of reinstatement. However, as noted in the review above, there is currently no 
theory about reinstatement in organizations. As such, this paper begins at the beginning, by 
seeking to understand the motivations for reinstating privileges. 
 
Practical and Theoretical Relevance 
 
From a practical perspective, reinstatement is a vitally important issue, with potentially 
significant effects on the recipient, the manager, other organization members, the organization as 
a whole, and the greater public. Below, three diverse examples demonstrating the importance and 
complexity of reinstatement are presented. 
 
The first example was documented by Connerley et al. (2001). The incident concerned a man 
named Randy who was convicted of manslaughter after killing his office romance partner. Randy 
served five years in prison, and then reapplied for his job, which he eventually regained. He was 
initially reinstated to exactly the same position, but this led to a series of confrontations with 
coworkers, and Randy had to be transferred. The confrontations continued, as did the transfers. 
Worse still, Randy repeated his past behavior: he attempted to begin another office romance and 
killed the woman for not reciprocating his interest. Randy was convicted of murder and the 
family of his victim sued the organization. 
 
The second example is Jones’ (1961) case of Tuff, an employee of a large manufacturing 
company who was terminated for assaulting a supervisor. He was later reinstated by a third-party 
arbitrator, and went on to perform excellently. Before being terminated, Tuff’s workmanship, 
performance, and attitude were rated below average by his supervisors and he had received two 
warnings for absenteeism. However, upon returning to work after reinstatement, Tuff’s 
performance improved in every way. After two years, he was rated above average by his 
supervisors, who commented that they admired his hard work. 
 
Finally, in the American legal profession there is ongoing debate about the reinstatement of 
disbarred and suspended attorneys. As many as 200 previously disbarred or suspended attorneys 
are reinstated every year (Levine 1998). However, many legal scholars and concerned officials 
are dissatisfied with current state policies governing this process (Lacey 2001). In large part, this 
dissatisfaction reflects the absence of an accepted theoretical logic or established process for 
reinstatement, and one reason for this is lack of consensus about the appropriate motivations for 
reinstating lawyers (e.g., Davis 1996, Levine 1998; Rotunda and Johnson 1994). The debate has 
many legal scholars and professionals growing concerned about the integrity and image of their 
entire profession (Rotunda and Johnson 1994; also see Grant and Alfred 2007 for a discussion of 
similar issues among US physicians). 
 
These examples highlight the fact that reinstatement in organizations is an important and 
complex issue. It is not as straightforward or inconsequential as its near absence from the 
literature suggests. Although there are potentially enormous consequences for individuals, 
organizations, and society, managers have no firm basis on which to make reinstatement 
decisions (Grant and Alfred 2007; Lacey 2001). As such, there can be little doubt of the practical 
benefit of better understanding reinstatement. 
 
Along with its practical importance, a better understanding of reinstatement will also provide 
several theoretical contributions to organization science. The most obvious of these is parsimony 
through the integration of several disparate literatures. Reinstatement can encompass several 
related phenomena, such as reinstatement through arbitration, relenting after social ostracism, 
reintegration after communal and institutional punishment, and the readmission of individuals in 
mixed-motive, experimental gaming contexts (e.g., Bamberger and Donahue 1999; 
Braithwaite 1989; Cinyabuguma et al. 2005; Lacey 2001; Masclet 2003; Ouwerkerk 2003; 
Reitan 1996; Smith 1961; Williams 2001). A framework for understanding reinstatement in 
organizations could integrate these disparate findings into a unified whole. 
 
In addition, advancement toward a theory of reinstatement would begin to resolve 
inconsistencies in research findings about the effects of organizational punishment. Ball et al. 
(1994, p. 299) noted, “Studies [of organizational punishment] have found positive, negative, and 
non-significant relationships, suggesting that important variables may be missing from our 
understanding of this common managerial behavior.” Examples of these inconsistencies show 
the need to understand reinstatement. O’Reilly and Weitz (1980) found a positive correlation 
between a supervisor’s unit performance rating and the use of sanctions. Beyer and Trice (1984), 
however, showed that while management discipline did influence subsequent behavior, this had 
minimal effect on actual performance. Podsakoff et al. (1982) found the same. Even more 
concerning is Atwater et al. (2001) finding that, while disciplined individuals often change their 
behavior in the intended fashion, recipients and observers of organizational discipline may also 
lose respect for the disciplining manager and harbor negative feelings toward the organization. 
Similarly, Augustine-Adams (1998–1999) found that some members of a large Christian church 
returned to full activity and commitment after being reinstated, but others became hostile and 
actively sought to harm the organization. 
 
A theory of reinstatement could resolve and explain these mixed findings in the organizational 
punishment literature. This assertion is based on the observation from criminal and legal 
philosophers that collectives (e.g., organizations, communities, countries) that focus solely on the 
act of punishment will continue to suffer the adverse effects of discipline, and receive only some 
of its potential benefits (e.g., Braithwaite 1989; Reitan 1996). This is because delinquent 
behavior and subsequent punishment tend to separate the offender from the collective in ways 
that stigmatize the offender, convincing the collective and the individual that change is 
impossible (Braithwaite 1989). As a result, offenders withdraw from the collective and become 
more inclined to indulge in their own delinquent behavior or at least less interested in benefiting 
the collective. In contrast, if the collective also attends to reinstatement when punishing an 
offender, stigma, withdrawal, and recidivism are all less likely (Braithwaite 1994; Braithwaite 
and Mugford 1994; Makkai and Braithwaite 1994). 
 
Extending these observations to the organizational context, this paper contends that successful 
discipline needs to include an understanding of reinstatement. As in criminology and law, the 
results of punishment in organizations will be most beneficial when reinstatement is also 
addressed. Moreover, only by examining what occurs after punishment is complete can the 
disciplinary process be fully understood. As such, a theory of reinstatement would complement 
existing theories of punishment, and could provide the insight to resolve the seemingly 
conflicting findings about the effects of discipline. 
 
To review, reinstatement is a process where a manager restores previously removed privileges. 
The addition of reinstatement to the conversation about discipline may clarify existing 
discrepancies in the research findings, and improve the practice of discipline in organizations. 
The first step in understanding reinstatement is examining the motivations for its occurrence, so 
as to know when and why it will occur. To that end, this paper adopts the framework of 




This section reviews the research domain of relationship repair—as introduced by Dirks et al. 
(2009)—as a way to understand reinstatement. When an organizational member offends or 
commits a transgression against another, three events may occur, alone or in combination. These 
events are loss of trust between the parties (e.g., Gillespie and Dietz 2009), an increase of 
negative affect between the parties (e.g., Shapiro 1991), and the cease of positive exchange 
between the parties (e.g., Bottom et al. 2002). Relationship repair, therefore, is a process in 
which activities by one or both parties return the relationship to a positive state, by restoring one 
or more of trust, positive affect and exchange between parties (Dirks et al. 2009). 
 
The reinstatement of privileges represents a process of relationship repair. Because of a 
transgression, a once positive relational state between the parties becomes negative. Punishment 
is applied and the offending party loses privileges. To regain the lost privileges, actions are taken 
to restore the prior positive relational state among the parties. As a final part of the relationship 
repair, the disciplined member’s privileges are restored. For example, imagine an athlete caught 
using banned performance enhancing substances. As punishment, the athlete loses game playing 
time and is demoted from the position of captain. After appropriate reparations, including public 
apologies and remaining clean for a period of time, the athlete is reinstated to game play and to 
the position of captain. In this example, the trust and exchange aspects of the relationship are 
repaired. The athlete is permitted to resume play (positive exchange) and the coaches show their 
trust by restoring athlete to a leadership role, and a restoration of positive affect between coach 
and athlete may also follow. However, it is not necessary that all three of positive exchange, 
trust, and affect be restored for reinstatement to occur. For example, a worker may be terminated 
for misconduct, resulting in the loss of positive exchange (i.e., work for wages), interpersonal 
trust, and positive affect. If that worker is reinstated to the position through a union’s threat to 
strike on his behalf, it may be that only positive exchange is restored. Management may continue 
to distrust the worker, and mutual negative affect may persist. Thus, while some instances of 
reinstatement repair all three elements of the relationship, this is not a requirement. 
 
Dirks et al. (2009, p. 78) offer a four-phase process model for understanding how relationship 
repair occurs. Phase 1 is the initial state of trust, positive affect, and positive exchange between 
the parties before any transgression occurs. Phase 2 involves the perception of an act of 
transgression by one party. Phase 3 is the process of actually repairing the relationship. In Phase 
3, the offender, the offended, or both attempt to repair the relationship so as to increase trust, 
restore positive affect, or resume positive exchange between the parties. Finally, Phase 4 is 
concerned with the state of trust, affect, and exchange after repair efforts are complete. 
Reinstatement is a part of the third phase in those cases where disciplinary action occurs. If the 
breach in Phase 2 leads to punishment of the offender, then the decision about whether and when 
to restore lost privileges (i.e., reinstatement) is an important part of the means by which the 
relationship between parties is restored. Reinstatement will also play a key role in determining 
the resumption of trust, positive affect, and positive exchange (Braithwaite 1994; Braithwaite 
and Mugford 1994; Makkai and Braithwaite 1994). 
 
Three Bases for Relationship Repair 
 
For a relationship to be repaired, at least one party involved must attempt to restore the positive 
relationship. Dirks et al. (2009) identify three broad categories of means by which such attempts 
can be made. These are the attributional, social equilibrium, and structural bases of relationship 
repair (Dirks et al. 2009). For simplicity, each of the three is discussed independently below, but 
in reality any or all may pertain simultaneously. 
 
The first basis for relationship repair is causal attribution. One way to repair a relationship is to 
have the offended party acquire information or change perspective in such a way as to remove 
any negative perception of the offender (Rhee and Valdez 2009). In other words, a relationship 
can be repaired to the extent that the offended party attributes the wrong doing to some external, 
environmental factor rather than to the internal nature of the offender (Weiner 1979, 1985; 
Weiner et al. 1971). Returning to the earlier example of the athlete punished for using banned 
substances, the relationship can be repaired if the athlete is able to convince the coach and 
athletic organization that the banned substance was used accidentally. For example, if it is shown 
that the substance was included in a food, but not labeled as an ingredient in that food, then the 
causal attribution for the wrongdoing may become external, as the fault of the food 
manufacturer, rather than the athlete. If this occurs, the athlete is absolved and the relationship is 
repaired on the basis of changed causal attributions. 
 
The second basis, social equilibrium, uses explicit social rituals to repair the relationship (Ren 
and Gray 2009). For a discipline-worthy offense to be perceived as having occurred, some aspect 
of the relationship between parties must be perceived as being in disequilibrium; relevant norms 
of behavior or respect have been violated (Dirks et al. 2009). For example, if an employee is 
habitually late for work, that employee is violating the expected rules of interaction, and thereby 
damaging the relationship. Similarly, members of a Christian church may be perceived as 
violating normative rules when they commit prohibited or sinful actions. In these cases, 
inappropriate behavior has moved the relationships between parties into disequilibrium, and the 
means of repairing the relationship is reestablishing equilibrium through various social rituals 
(Goffman 1967). In the example of the Christian church, the offending individual may engage in 
appropriate acts of penance or contrition, and the church may redeem or otherwise restore the 
members to their standing (e.g., Augustine-Adams 1998–1999). Social equilibrium is restored 
through appropriate rituals that reconstitute the relationship between parties in response to the 
initial transgression. 
 
The third basis in Dirks et al. (2009) paper involves changing the structure of the relationship so 
as to achieve repair. In this case, some aspects of the physical or social environment surrounding 
the relationship are changed to facilitate desired behavior and reduce the likelihood of 
undesirable behavior. For example, if a store cashier is caught stealing money, that cashier may 
be disciplined and granted a second chance, which involves reassignment to a position that does 
not involve handling money (Geller 1991). Structure-based relationship repair restores the 
positive relational state by providing assurances to both parties that the offending action will not 
occur again. 
 
Fourth Basis for Relationship Repair: Power 
 
Although Dirks et al. (2009, p. 82) mention the important role that power is likely to play in 
relationship repair, they do not develop that role. This is unfortunate, since power is a highly 
influential factor in shaping behavior in most organizational relationships (Kahn and 
Boulding 1964; Pfeffer 1997; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), and, as shall be discussed in the 
current paper, may be particularly important in reinstatement. As such, this paper extends the 
relationship repair framework by introducing power as a fourth basis for relationship repair. The 
understanding of power in this paper is based on the power-dependence literature (e.g., 
Emerson 1962; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), the neo-institutional literature (e.g., North 1990), and 
the stakeholder view of the firm (e.g., Freeman 1984). 
 
Power is the ability of one party to influence the behavior and outcomes of another party, 
independent of the desires of the party being influenced (Ocasio 2002, p. 361). As a result, power 
is derived from social relationships, and all social relationships involve some element of power 
(Emerson 1962). In organizations, power is typically exercised through the control of resources 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), and may be exerted directly upon the focal individual or indirectly 
through third parties (Brass 2005; North 1990). Employees pursuing arbitration to overturn a 
disciplinary action and have their privileges restored provide an example of the direct use of 
power (Gold et al. 1978). In contrast, mobilizing strikes and boycotts to regain privileges would 
involve the indirect use of power (Frooman 1999). In both cases, power, as the ability to coerce 
others, is used to restore the exchange relationship between two parties. 
 
Seven Motivations for Reinstatement 
 
Using the relationship repair framework, this section develops seven propositions about the 
motivations for managers to reinstate member privileges. The motivations are organized within 
the four bases of the framework, and each is introduced by a concrete example taken from either 
the academic or business press. 
 
Attribution as a Basis for Reinstatement 
 
The attributional basis of relationship repair is concerned with whether the offending behaviors 
are attributed to internal characteristics of the individual (e.g., integrity) or to external 
characteristics that are out of the control of the individual (e.g., mental illness or alcoholism’; 
Dirks et al. 2009). For reinstatement, a manger’s attributions will influence beliefs about the 
likelihood of an offender’s behavior changing or remaining the same, and thus the desirability of 
reinstatement. Take for example the following decision to reinstate a worker once the source of 
the transgression was discovered. 
 
“After Aquila Inc. fired meter reader Michael Combs for harassing a customer on 
company time … an arbitrator ordered him reinstated, reasoning that Aquila had failed to 
consider whether his bipolar disorder contributed to his misconduct. … [T]he arbitrator 
ruled, ‘it cannot be concluded that the Company had just cause to terminate the 
Grievant’s employment since it erred in treating the discharge solely as a disciplinary 
matter rather than a disability question.’ The arbitrator conditioned Combs’ reinstatement 
on medical documentation that he is continuing to take his medication and capable of 
returning to work. … In its motion [through court appeal] seeking to vacate the 
arbitration order, [Aquila] said that ‘public policy cannot tolerate a second chance for 
Combs.’ … ‘considering the world in which we find ourselves, it flies against notions of 
common sense to reinstate an employee who criminally harassed a customer on Company 
time, in Company clothing, using a Company vehicle where there is—and cannot be—no 
guarantee such conduct will not recur’” (Margolies 2006). 
 
As suggested by this example, recidivism can be a crucial consideration in reinstatement 
decisions; no manager wants to restore lost privileges, and then have the offender repeat the 
delinquent behavior. The desire to avoid recidivism makes causal attributions very important. 
Individuals assess others’ behavior by attributing it to specific causes (Weary and Reich 2000), 
and the causes they choose define their expectancies about future behavior (Weiner et al. 1971). 
In reinstatement, the most important aspect of causal attribution is source stability, which refers 
to the likelihood of the same cause being influential in the future (Weiner 1985). Unstable 
sources of behavior are unique and transient (Weiner 1979); they are not likely to recur (e.g., a 
family member’s death, a serious traffic accident). In contrast, stable sources of behavior are 
those that are apt to be relevant again in the future (e.g., personality). Behaviors that are 
attributed to stable sources are viewed as more likely to be repeated (Weiner 1985). As such, if 
managers attribute the offender’s problematic behavior to stable sources, they will expect 
recidivism, and be less likely to reinstate. Consistent with this reasoning, Carroll (1978) found 
that attributed causal stability influenced US Pennsylvanian Parole Board Members’ expectations 
about recidivism in parole decision cases; parole was most likely to be granted when the board 
members attributed the offender’s crime to unstable causes. 
 
Proposition 1. Managers are more likely to reinstate member privileges when the member’s 
delinquent behavior is attributed to unstable causes. 
 
Social Equilibrium as a Basis for Reinstatement 
 
The social equilibrium basis of relationship repair maintains that transgression involves the 
violation of social norms, and that reestablishing equilibrium requires appropriate courses of 
action related to those norms (Dirks et al. 2009). A norm is “a belief that a certain type of action 
must be performed … anytime a relevant type of circumstance gets validly instantiated” 
(Roversi 2005, p. 97). Considering reinstatement in terms of social equilibrium highlights two 
motivations: the dictates of norms themselves and the availability of procedures for reinstating 
privileges. 
 
Norms of Forgiveness and Redemption 
 
Norms are expressed in organizations through various behavioral practices, such as rituals 
(Arno 1976; Pratt 1981) and act as guides to appropriate behavior in particular circumstances 
(Lacey 2001; March and Olsen 2004). For example, Klaas and Wheeler (1990) found that 
managerial disciplinary practices were shaped by the desire to “adhere to institutionalized 
norms” (p. 119). Likewise, Klaas and Dell’omo (1997) demonstrated that organizational norms 
influenced whether managers used dismissal in response to poor work performance. In regards to 
reinstatement, consider the following ongoing debate concerning disbarred lawyers. 
 
“Readmission decisions [for disbarred and suspended lawyers] are cloaked in biblical 
professions of the importance of redemption … the theory of discipline is looking 
forward rather than backward. … If dangers to the public are gone, then [a disbarred 
lawyer] should get back in. … [Disbarred] lawyers shouldn’t fare any worse than other 
criminals, who, once punished, have a right and obligation to proceed with their lives as 
productive members of society” (Davis 1996, p. A1). 
 
The quote above demonstrates the potential influence of norms on reinstatement decisions. Of 
particular importance will be managers’ perceptions of norms and behavioral expectations 
concerning forgiveness and redemption. As defined by Aquino et al. (2003), forgiveness occurs 
where a person “overcome[s] negative emotions toward his or her offender and … refrains from 
causing the offender harm” (p. 212). Redemption is “the ability to overcome one’s past mistakes 
or release oneself from blame” (Stone and Stone-Romero 1998, p. 49). 
 
While organizational research on both of these normative behaviors is sparse (Bradfield and 
Aquino 1999), there is some anecdotal and empirical evidence suggesting that reinstating 
privileges can serve as a way of expressing norms of forgiveness and redemption. In Bottom et 
al. (2002) experiments, participants expressed forgiveness to former partners by restoring 
cooperation the opportunity to resume participation. Similarly Augustine-Adams (1998–1999), 
in reviewing disciplinary court procedures and cases in a large international Christian church, 
found beliefs in forgiveness and redemption expressed by the church by restoring privileges to 
members who had been judged as penitent. Thus, when there are norms of forgiveness, and 
associated rituals for reestablishing the social equilibrium, managers will be more likely to 
reinstate member privileges. 
 
Proposition 2. Managers are more likely to reinstate member privileges when relevant norms 




A primary function of formal rules and procedural norms is to reduce uncertainty about how to 
behave in a particular situation (Thompson 1967). In situations where one does not know what is 
expected, there is high uncertainty about what behavior is appropriate; individuals must 
individually determine what course of action to pursue (Goodrick and Salancik 1996; 
Weick 1995). A topical example is provided by an issue currently facing online social, 
networking organizations: 
 
Online social, networking organizations (e.g., MySpace and Facebook) have few 
established procedures for reinstating account privileges to members. Once privileges are 
removed it becomes very difficult for them to be returned because neither the member 
nor the companies have clearly established normative guidelines to follow (Abril and 
Cava 2008). 
 
When confronted with uncertainty about how to act, individuals typically choose to do what is 
familiar and to maintain the status quo (Bazerman et al. 2001; Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988). 
In the context of reinstatement, this suggests that managers may be inclined against reinstatement 
if there are no established procedures available. If it is not clear what managers should do, the 
safest and preferable option may seem to be leaving the situation alone, letting the punishment 
stand (Hammond et al. 2006). Also, without clear procedures for reinstatement, the transgressor 
may be uncertain what action should be taken to repair the relationship. 
 
Proposition 3. Managers are more likely to reinstate member privileges when there are 
established procedures for doing so. 
 
Structure as a Basis for Reinstatement 
 
Structural efforts at relationship repair tend to be most concerned with restoring positive 
exchange; it may be presumed that trust and positive affect will follow, but the structural changes 
are clearly focused on creating conditions for the resumption of exchange (Dirks et al. 2009). In 
this sense, structure-based reinstatement can be seen as the most self-interested or profit-
maximizing, to the extent that it seeks to maximize the exchange-based benefits of a relationship 
with less emphasis on trust and affect. A manager’s motivation to reinstate through structure thus 
derives primarily from relative costs and benefits of doing so. As an example, consider the 
reinstatement practices in Japanese communities. 
 
In Japanese hamlets—communities formally and hierarchically organized for economic, 
labor, and social support—households that break community rules are formally 
ostracized and the economic and social benefits provided by the hamlet are withdrawn. 
“[T]he maintenance of … formal [ostracism] places a strain upon the [Japanese] hamlet. 
… The presence in the midst of a hamlet of one ostracized household is at best an 
inconvenience. … [W]ith the loss of a household, many gaps appear in hamlet groupings, 
the youth clubs, the women’s clubs, shrine groups, work gangs, and mutual labor 
groupings. … While it may be far from their thoughts at the time of expelling the 
offenders, the hamlet households … eventually begin to consider ways of healing the 
rupture in community relations … [through] the readmission of the household and its 
restoration to its former status” (Smith 1961, p. 528). 
 
There may be times when a manager would choose not to reinstate a punished individual, but has 
little practical choice, as in the case of the Japanese hamlets. If it is more expensive to withhold 
privileges than to return them, there is a strong incentive for the manager to reinstate. In such 
cases, structural solutions become important, as managers forced to reinstate must structure the 
work environment in ways that reduce the likelihood of future problems. For example, Darmon 
(1990) found that terminating an employee typically entailed greater economic costs than 
benefits because of high costs associated with recruiting, selection, and training, and therefore 
suggested retraining and member development programs rather than termination. Similarly, 
Klaas and Wheeler (1990) found that employees’ operational criticality and interchangeability 
were strong predictors of the punishment severity for poor performance; with greater criticality 
and lesser interchangeability, managers’ punishments tended to be less severe. Extending these 
findings to reinstatement suggests that managers are more likely to reinstate privileges when 
doing so costs less than withholding them. 
 
Proposition 4. Managers are more likely to reinstate member privileges when the economic cost 
of not doing so is high. 
 
Power as a Basis for Reinstatement 
 
The fourth basis of relationship repair concerns the use of power, typically in coercive or non-
mutual routes to reinstatement. As with structure-based reinstatement, the emphasis in the use of 
one party’s power may be more on exchange or one-sided gain, rather than restoring trust or 
positive affect. In cases of reinstatement, power may be exercised by either the punished 
individual or the manager, and recognizing this reveals three important potential sources of 





In December of 1960, a borough council found Carl Ehnis—a police chief in New 
Providence, New Jersey—guilty of misusing department funds. Ehnis was demoted from 
chief to sergeant. Ehnis appealed the decision to a county court where the judge found the 
demoted sergeant not guilty. The judge overturned the demotion and ordered Ehnis’ 
immediate reinstatement as police chief (New York Times 1961). Carl Ehnis served 
thereafter as police chief in New Providence until his retirement in 1974 
(http://www.nwprov.org/police). 
 
All organizations are subject to the authority of some regulatory bodies (Gooderham et al. 1999), 
and those bodies often have the power to mandate reinstatement by threat of various economic 
and institutional penalties, such as fines or loss of license (Scott 2002; Strang and Sine 2001). In 
the above example, the judge represents an authorized regulatory agent that ordered the 
reinstatement of Ehnis’ previous privileges of rank. The police borough acquiesced to this 
request because of the formal power represented and exerted by the judge. In an organizational 
context, hierarchical superiors are also a potential source of mandated reinstatement. If a middle 
manager who is against reinstating a particular employee’s privileges is ordered to do so by 
senior executives, reinstatement becomes much more likely. 
 
Proposition 5. Managers are more likely to reinstate member privileges when authorized 




In December 1913, two railway workers were discharged for negligence while on the job. 
After a year of deliberation between the union and the railroad, there was a union-backed 
labor strike of 5,000 workers that paralyzed 600 miles of railroad line in New England. 
Within hours, without arbitration or legal action, the railroad reinstated the two men to 
full employment. The federal official who mediated the strike urged the railroad “in the 
interest of the public to accede to the [union’s] request” and commented to the press “the 
strike was complete and the company had no alternative [but to reinstate the two men].’” 
(New York Times 1914, p. 1). 
 
Powerful organizational stakeholders may motivate managers to reinstate privileges. The 
stakeholder perspective views organizations as open systems with varying degrees of 
dependence on internal and external parties (Freeman 1984; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Groups 
such as employees, suppliers, and investors provide essential resources to organizations, so 
managers may select courses of action that satisfy the implied or expressed desires of those 
groups (Agle et al. 1999). While different stakeholder groups have varying degrees of 
institutional legitimacy (Mitchell et al. 1997), they often attempt to influence organizational 
behavior (Hendry 2005). To the extent that a stakeholder group can control essential resources, 
they will gain influence over organizational actions (Frooman 1999). This is illustrated in the 
example above, in which a labor union, despite the lack of any formal or legal mandate, exerted 
sufficient influence to have employees reinstated. Thus, managers may reinstate privileges to 
appease powerful stakeholders. 
 
Proposition 6. Managers are more likely to reinstate member privileges when powerful 




While the previous two motivations involved the disciplined using power to regain privileges, it 
is important to remember that in many cases, it is the manager who has greater power, and 
managers may make intentional use of that power to further their ends. Managers can have their 
own reasons for reinstating, and chief among these is the effect that reinstatement can have in 
creating highly committed employees. Committed, loyal employees have always been an 
important source of organizational performance, and this seems to be increasingly true with the 
shift to expert-based knowledge work and more complex work structures (Hackman and 
Oldham 1976; Sturges et al. 2002). Related to this, evidence suggests that managers may use 
their power to reinstate as a means of fostering loyalty. 
 
“For aberrant members of the Church to lose its privileges and blessings may cause them 
to appreciate more what they have lost. The feeling of aloneness and of not belonging 
stirs them to repentance and increased faithfulness” (Stapley 1963, p. 36–37). 
 
As this example highlights, reinstatement can have profound effects on the individual reinstated. 
Recognizing this, some managers may choose to use reinstatement as means to producing those 
effects. Adler and Adler (1988) provide an example of such behavior in their study of intense 
loyalty formation (also see Goldner 1965 for a comparable example in a manufacturing context). 
They describe how a college basketball coach’s use harsh public punishments and difficult 
processes of reinstatement created great loyalty and commitment among players. Consistent with 
this, research in ostracism has found that allowing previously ostracized individuals to return to 
the group increases group cohesiveness (Williams 2001), and social dilemma researchers have 
shown that readmission can boost group performance (Cinyabuguma et al. 2005; Masclet 2003; 
Ouwerkerk 2003). A variety of social and psychological mechanisms presumably underlie these 
effects, including dissonance reduction (Aronson 1992), responses to control deprivation 
(Greenberger and Strasser 1986), and motivational efficacy (Hall and Isabella 1985). However, 
with regard to reinstatement, two points seem clear: reinstatement can increase member 
commitment, and managers may use reinstatement intentionally for this purpose. 
 
Proposition 7. Managers are more likely to reinstate member privileges when they desire 
increased organizational commitment. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Organizational discipline is usually treated as a two-act play. The first act is the punishment; 
privileges are removed from the delinquent member. The second act involves reactions to the 
punishment, including the emotions, cognitions, and behaviors of the disciplining manager, the 
punished individual, and witnesses. Current theories of discipline in organizations stop at this 
point. However, as explained above, there are actually three acts. The third and final part of the 
discipline process is the possible reinstatement of lost privileges. This paper adopted relationship 
repair as a lens to bring the topic of reinstatement into the conversation about organizational 
discipline and to provide a foundation for future theoretical development. 
 
A coherent theory of reinstatement could resolve existing ambiguity about the effects of 
discipline in organizations. At the simplest level, understanding reinstatement could clarify why 
punishment sometimes produces more harm than good. In general, theories of discipline predict 
that the right punishment will produce mostly beneficial results. Sometimes it does, and these 
may be the instances where reinstatement would have been unnecessary or even inappropriate. In 
contrast, for cases where punishment causes more harm than good, the explanation may be a lack 
of reinstatement. At a minimum, reinstatement can help us to ask better questions about the 
complex effects of discipline in organizations. 
 
As demonstrated by this paper, a better understanding of reinstatement would also contribute to 
knowledge about the broader domain of relationship repair. Even the initial work done in this 
paper provides useful insight. Although Dirks et al. (2009) mentioned power in passing, they did 
not develop its role as a potential basis for relationship repair. In contrast, viewing reinstatement 
as an instance of relationship repair highlighted the importance of power. Reinstatement often 
involves the exercise of power. The addition of this fourth basis for relationship repair begins to 
acknowledge the central role of power in organizational behavior, and thereby expands the 
domain. 
 
However, this paper is only a beginning; much work remains before a coherent theory of 
reinstatement will be reached. Explications of the processes, techniques, experiences, and effects 
of reinstatement need to be developed and investigated. These are beyond the scope of this 
paper, but the motivations provided here can serve as the foundation for the next steps in 
developing the theory. For one, the motivations for reinstating privileges suggest likely sites for 
observing the practice. For example, the relative costs motivation suggests comparing industries 
with chronic labor shortages to those with surplus workers. Likewise, organizations with a need 
for highly committed members could usefully be contrasted with those that have little need for 
loyalty. 
 
As well, distinguishing the different motivations for reinstatement can help to clarify differences 
in the processes and results of reinstatement. Anecdotal evidence already suggests that the 
motivations and methods of reinstatement may be as important as the actual privileges that are 
restored. Jones’ (1961) case study of two organizations’ reinstatement practices offers a good 
example. One organization went to great lengths to demonstrate their interest in the employee 
being reinstated (e.g., personal consultations, lengthy explanations, provisions of action options), 
while the other organization displayed no such interest (e.g., reinstated employees only learned 
of their reinstatement from coworkers). These two processes seem likely to generate very 
different results, and one can imagine how each process is associated with a different motivation. 
 
Beyond reinstatement per se, this paper also extends the larger domain of relationship repair by 
adding an additional basis for achieving repair. Dirks et al. (2009) noted that the different routes 
to relationship repair likely interact in various ways that facilitate or hinder the process. 
Recognizing the role of power in relationship repair enriches the possibilities of these 
interactions. For example, if power and attributional routes were simultaneously pursued to 
repair a particular relationship, the use of power might undermine any attributional benefit to 
trust or affect. Coercing someone to take a course of action creates a greater likelihood of 
offenders perceiving themselves as losing control, potentially leading to even further losses in 
trust and positive affect, rather than gains. The relationship repair domain is quite new, but 
certainly seems to hold great promise for understanding interpersonal dynamics in organizations 
particularly if it incorporates the ubiquitous role of power in organizations. 
 
This paper ends as it began, stressing that reinstatement occurs often, in all kinds of 
organizations, and at every level within them. Profit and nonprofit organizations are facing the 
challenges of reinstatement, as are military, sport, religious, and professional organizations. In all 
cases, reinstatement can have extensive consequences for the people involved, for the 
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